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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
Foreclosure Of In Rem Tax Lien
Town of Somers v. Covey35 involved reargument before the Court of Appeals,
following reversal of its prior decision 36 by the Supreme Court of the United
States. 3 7 The Supreme Court had reversed on the grounds that notice by publication, to an incompetent, of foreclosure of a tax lien did not satisfy the requirements
of due process.
In the instant case, the Court explained that its prior decision was not based
on the sufficiency of such notice, but rather on the grounds that the incompetent's
committee had pursued the wrong remedy. The committee sought to vacate the
judgment of foreclosure, but the Court had held that, pursuant to statute,38 the
foreclosure proceedings could only be attacked by an action to set aside the deed
executed by virtue of that judgment. Hence, sufficiency of notice was immaterial
in view of this holding; furthermore, the committee was now without remedy
39
altogether for the statutory remedy was subject to a two-year limitation period
which had now expired. Thus the committee defeated himself by persisting in
his error.
Claim For Refund Of General Business Tax
The City of New York imposed a gross receipts tax4" upon advertising
receipts earned by petitioner over a three year period, upon the theory that these
receipts were the fruits of activity peculiarly local, even though the subsequent
circulation of the magazine could be considered interstate commerce. Petitioner,
a New York City publisher, brought this proceeding to obtain a refund of monies
paid to the city declaring that the tax upon gross receipts was a burden upon
interstate commerce. 41 To succeed, petitioner had to distinguish the facts of its
own situation from the Supreme Court decision in Western Livestock v. Bureau of
Revenue,42 a case involving state taxation of advertising receipts for advertising
appearing in a magazine circulated throughout the country. The tax was sustained,
''43
and the business of "preparing, printing, and publishing magazine advertising
was deemed to be local activity, and any burden upon interstate commerce viewed
as too remote to call for an invalidation of the tax.
35. 2 N.Y.2d 250, 140 N.E.2d 277 (1957).
36. 308 N.Y. 798, 125 N.E.2d 862 (1955).
37. 351 U.S. 141 (1956); see 6 BUFFALO L. REV. 345 (1957) for discussion of
the instant case as well as the Supreme Court decision.
38. N.Y. TAx LAW §165-h(7).
39. Ibid.
40. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF CITY OF NEW YORK, §§41, 46.

41. New Yorker Magazine v. Gerosa, 3 N.Y.2d 362, 165 N.Y.S.2d 469 (1957).
42. 303 U.S. 250 (1937); for a discussion of the decision see, note, 13 IND. L. J.
500 (1937). The case is also noted in ROTrScHAEFER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 168,
169 (1939).

43. 303 U.S. at 258, 259.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Petitioner in New Yorker v. Gerosa4 was unable to factually distinguish the
Western Livestock decision, and the dismissal of its claim was affirmed. The only
reasonable basis for distinction would be the fact that one of the reasons for the
decision in the Western Livestock case was that a tax on the taxpayer's activity
could not be levied elsewhere. 45 In the instant case, the Court, in accepting the
finding of the Comptroller of New York City, admitted that the gross receipts
could in part be subjected to taxation elsewhere. This is evidenced by the fact
that the tax here involved was imposed on advertising receipts, less those received
from the Chicago branch office of the petitioner.4" Nevertheless, this is not to
admit that the sale of advertising is now considered in New York as interstate
commerce, but rather a recognition that petitioner carried on local activity in
two separate cities located in different states, and that each city could properly
tax the amount of gross receipts allocable to advertising activity within that
particular city. The Court correctly rejected the attempts of petitioner to recover
the funds paid, and maintained the position found acceptable to the Supreme
Court where advertising receipts are involved. The sale of advertising space, and
the receipt of advertising receipts is a purely local activity, subject to a municipal
tax on said receipts.
Recovery Of Taxes Paid Under Mistake Of Law
Despite the statutory admonition that "when relief against mistake is sought
shall not be denied merely because the mistake is one of law rather than
fact,"47 Lord Ellenborough's famous dictum in Bilbie v. Lumley 4s still influences
New York law.
...relief

Without statutory provision to the contrary, taxes cannot be recovered
unless paid under protest or involuntarily. 49 Payments under mistake of fact has
long been classed as involuntary 0 but no relief has been given for mistake of law,5t
52
often for little more reason than that given by Lord Ellenborough.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Supra, note 41.
See note 42 supra, at 260.
3 N.Y.2d at 471, 165 N.Y.S2d at 471.
N.Y. Civ. PAc. Acr §112-f.
2 East 469, 102 Eng. Rep. 248 (1802), wherein Lord Ellenborough said:
... (E]very

man must be taken to be cognizant of the law;
otherwise there is no saying to what extent the excuse of
ignorance might not be carried.
49. Adrico Realty Corp. v. New York, 250 N.Y. 29, 164 N.E. 732 (1928).
50. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. New York, 144 N.Y. 494, 39 N.E. 386 (1895);
Brooklyn, Q. C. & S. R. Co. v. New York. 224 App. Div. 659, 229 N.Y. Supp. 9
(2d Dep't 1928), af'd, 250 N.Y. 542, 166 N.E. 317 (1929).
51. Sanford v. New York, 33 Barb. 147 (N.Y. 1860); New York v. New Rochelle, 36 N.Y. Supp. 211 (2d Dep't 1895).
52. Cf. Adrico Realty Corp. v. New York, supra note 49, per Crane, J.:
... [The taxpayer] . . . may be charged with a knowledge
of the law, but not with knowledge of those facts which,
being disputed, must ultimately be decided by a court,

